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Exploring Anti-poaching Strategies for Wildlife Crime with a Simple and General Agent-Based Model

  1. 1.Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law EnforcementAmsterdamThe Netherlands
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10423)

Abstract

Understanding and preventing wildlife crime is challenging because of the complex interdependencies between animals, poachers, and rangers. To tackle this complexity, this study introduces a simple, general agent-based model of wildlife crime. The model is abstract and can be used to derive general conclusions about the emergence and prevention of wildlife crime. It can also be tailored to create scenarios which allows researchers and practitioners to better understand the dynamics in specific cases. This was illustrated by applying the model to the context of rhino poaching in South Africa. A virtual park populated by rhinos, poachers and rangers was created to study how an increase in patrol effort for two different anti-poaching strategies affect the number of poached rhinos. The results show that fence patrols are more effective in preventing wildlife crime than standard patrols. Strikingly, even increasing the number of ranger teams does not increase the effectiveness of standard patrols compared to fence patrols.

Keywords

Agent-based modeling Wildlife crime Anti-poaching strategies 

1 Introduction

The most common threats to plant and animal species worldwide are the destruction of their habitat and the over-exploitation of natural resources due to human activities like wildlife poaching and the illegal trade in wildlife products [1]. Recently, criminologists have also started to study wildlife crime. Understanding the processes behind crime often leads to practical implications for crime prevention strategies to improve its effectiveness. These strategies are based upon opportunity theories, seeking to create interventions that reduce victimization by removing or disrupting opportunities for crime. This includes increasing offender perceptions of risk and effort while minimizing perceptions of reward [2].

A commonly used strategy to prevent wildlife crime inside a protected area is aimed at increasing the poacher’s perception of risk. This is a data-driven approach that includes the analysis and mapping of poaching incidents [3]. Rangers are then deployed at poaching “hotspots” to either prevent or detect illegal activities. The downside of a data-driven approach is that it is heavily biased towards the spatial aspects of how the observation data was collected [4]. Ranger patrols are often not able to cover the whole protected area on a regular basis, leading to an incomplete knowledge of where and when poaching activities occur [5]. This is also referred to as the dark figure of crime [6]. Furthermore, when a new anti-poaching strategy has been put in place, rarely has it been evaluated in a standardized and systematic way.

As an alternative, wildlife crime can be studied as a complex and dynamic system. Its complexity does not only arise from the strategic interdependencies between animals and poachers. Poachers are also being tracked by rangers and seek to avoid interaction. This creates a second layer of strategic interdependence. To tackle the complexity of these systems, formal models allow researchers to study the implications of model assumptions. They help to understand why and under what conditions the models generate unexpected predictions [7]. Formal models allow researchers to explore the effectiveness of anti-poaching strategies even before they are implemented. They also allow to derive testable predictions about the conditions under which they are effective or not. For example, a successful strategy can turn ineffective at one moment, not because rangers failed to implement it, but simply because animals responded to changes in their environment. Subsequently, this motivates different poacher behavior which makes the adopted anti-poaching strategy ineffective.

Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a prominent formal modeling technique and particularly suited to study wildlife crime. In an agent-based model, each individual agent makes autonomous decisions, reacting to its environment and the behavior of other agents. AMB is a rigorous method, but hardly restricts the modeler in the choice of assumptions [8]. ABM allows researchers to tailor models to specific settings, for example by applying their model to a specific protected area, endangered species, or anti-poaching strategy. Such information is not only relevant for practitioners, but also expands the application of ABM into new areas of wildlife crime.

2 Objective

This study is aimed at exploring the dynamic interactions between the agents involved in wildlife crime using agent-based modeling. The objective was to develop a simple and general model that captures these dynamics under different anti-poaching scenarios. As an illustration, the model is demonstrated by applying it to the context of rhino poaching in South Africa.

3 The General Model: Animals, Poachers, and Rangers

For most cases of wildlife crime, there are three types of agents: animals, poachers, and rangers. The interactions between these agents can be described as a triple foraging process [9]: “animals search for food, poachers search for animals, and rangers search for poachers”. The model simulates a “world” with a population of animals where poachers go in and out to hunt for this species. The rangers try to disrupt and catch the poachers.

The world is a simplified representation of a protected area, like a national park. This virtual park is divided into grid cells that contain information about the environment, like the amount of resources available to the animal, how long it takes to move through this cell and any signs of animal, poacher, or ranger presence. The advantage of using a simplified model of a park is that dynamics cannot be driven by idiosyncratic characteristics of a specific setting, allowing the modeler to derive general conclusions about the implications of model assumptions. Nevertheless, the model is formulated in such a way that many idiosyncrasies of real parks can be implemented, which allows the study of dynamics also in specific settings.

In this model, animals are distributed over the virtual park and individually make decisions on where to move next based on the characteristics of the surrounding grid cells, choosing cells that are most attractive. At the same time, animals also change their environment by consuming resources. The resources recover over time. While the animals move over the landscape, they leave signs that can be detected by poachers, influencing their movement as they search for a target. Poachers can also detect signs of ranger activity and try to avoid those areas. Hence, poachers make decisions based on, among others, signs of recent animal activity and ranger activity. Poachers always start and end their hunt at the border of the virtual park. If a poacher encounters an animal within his observation radius, he kills it and the poached animal is removed from the park. The poacher then returns to the park’s border. When the poacher reaches the border, he successfully escaped and cannot be caught by rangers. Poachers remember the areas where they were successful, areas with high ranger activity and use that information to plan their subsequent incursions.

Rangers carry out patrols and search for signs of poaching. Just as poachers tend to go to areas with the highest animal activity, rangers tend to go to areas with the highest poaching activity. If a ranger detects a poacher within his observation radius, the ranger catches the poacher, removing him from the park. Rangers remember where they found poaching signs and tend to patrol those areas more frequently. Rangers can start either at a base camp inside the virtual park or at one of its borders.

Dynamics are broken down to a sequence of discrete events. At each event, first all animals decide in a random order where to move, followed by the moving decisions of poachers, and rangers. Finally, the simulation program updates the resources available at each cell, taking into account the consumption by animals and resource recovery. The decision-making of all three agents is similar and can be easily adjusted by adding relevant variables for a particular problem. This can also be used to create specific scenarios or conditions.

4 Example: Rhino Poaching in South Africa

Rhino poaching in South Africa has surged since 2008, in response to significant increases in black market prices for rhino horn [10]. This has led to discussion among conservationists, law enforcement and governmental organizations about effective anti-poaching strategies. Protected areas often have limited resources available, and this forces ranger commanders to implement patrol strategies that are as efficient as possible. A standard anti-poaching strategy is to deploy ground based patrol teams around rhino locations and searching for poaching activity. Almost all protected areas in South Africa are fenced or partially fenced, and fence patrols play an important role in the early detection of illegal fence crossings.

The model was applied to study the interactions and dynamics of rhino poaching and two different patrol strategies in a virtual fenced park. The free software ‘NetLogo’ [11] was used to program the virtual park and agents. The model, its code, and the used parameters are available online at the following website: http://modelingcommons.org/browse/one_model/5016.

4.1 Virtual Park

The virtual park consists of 100 by 100 grid cells. Time in the park is represented by discrete simulation events. In this example, the grid size and events are arbitrary measurements and do not map directly to real world size or time. During one event, all agents make decisions based on the surroundings and move to one of their neighboring cells. The virtual park borders are considered to be outside of the park. The other cells represent areas inside the park and contain information about the environment with the most important ones being resource abundance, terrain roughness, rhino signs, poacher signs, and ranger signs. Resources are randomly distributed over the landscape, and a small number of cells do not contain any resources at all. Clusters of high resources were created around the cells with high resources. Cells increase their resources by 1% when there are no rhino visits within 100 events. The reserve also contains ‘rough’ grid cells; cells that take more time to pass through. Roughness is represented as values ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being easily accessible areas and 5 the most difficult areas to move through. The agents “skip several turns”, depending on the roughness value of the cell they are in.

4.2 Rhino Agents

Two rhino species still exist today in South Africa: the white rhinoceros and black rhinoceros. While both species suffer from poaching, here the white rhino was chosen to model the rhino agents after. This decision was based upon fact that black rhino populations are low compared to the white rhino population and hence white rhinos are poached more often. This virtual park is inhabited by 70 white rhinos which are randomly distributed over the landscape. Rhinos are territorial animals, so if two rhinos end up within a 10 cell radius of each other, one of them moves to another random spot. The rhinos move by checking which of its surrounding cells is the most attractive. The rhinos do this by checking each of those cells for several variables like, how many resources there are, the roughness, and the distance to other rhinos. Each variable is scaled from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the highest preference. Each variable has a weight assigned to it to prioritize certain variables over the other. Next, the variables are summed and divided by the sum of weights. This information is stored as ‘attractiveness’ and describes the likelihood that the rhino moves to that cell. Once the rhino has moved to a neighboring cell, it consumes 1% of the resources and it includes that cell in its territory. To reduce the likelihood that a rhino enters another rhino’s territory, the cell attractiveness that belong to other rhinos is divided by 10. Finally, the rhino leaves signs at its current location. This probability was set at 0.5 and the signs remain visible for a certain number of events. This is a random number between 500 and 1000 events. At the start of each simulation run only the rhinos move around to establish their territory and to distribute rhino signs over the park. This setup duration is set to 1000 events.

4.3 Poacher Agents

Poachers start with no recollection of hunting grounds or areas to avoid; this is an updated procedure based on what the poacher encounters during his hunts. Poachers start at a random grid cell along the border. While they at the border, they cannot be detected or caught by rangers. Before the poacher decides where to move to, he checks the neighboring grid cells for the ranger presence. If so, the poacher abandons his current hunt, remembers this location as a ‘failure site’, and moves towards the nearest grid cell that is outside the park. While poachers are hunting, they have a similar decision-making rule as described for the rhinos. The variables that the poacher takes into account are the distance to the nearest ranger agent or camp, rhino activity signs, terrain roughness, and resources. Just as the rhino decision-making, each variable is scaled from 0 to 1, summed and then divided by the sum of weights. This information is stored as ‘attractiveness’ and describes the likelihood that the poacher moves to that cell. Poachers also leave signs with a probability of 0.5 and remain visible for a random number between 100 and 200 events. A poacher kills a rhino when it is on a neighboring grid cell of the poacher’s location. A poached carcass is an important poaching sign and remains visible throughout the simulation run. Poachers remember the number of events he has spent inside the park. When it exceeds a specified threshold, the poacher moves to the nearest grid cell that is outside the park. Once the poacher is outside the park, he waits a certain number of events before his next attempt. The waiting time is set at twice the specified threshold plus a random number between 1 and 100. When the waiting time is over, the poacher chooses a new start location based on his recollection of any ranger encounters and signs, poached rhino locations, and rhino activity signs. If the poacher does not remember any good sites, he picks a random grid cell along the border of the virtual park.

4.4 Ranger Agents

Ranger agents have a similar setup as the poacher agents. Rangers start at either a ranger camp or along the border of the virtual park. The camps are randomly distributed. All cells within a 10 cells radius around the camps do not contain any resources to avoid lingering rhinos around the camps. Rangers either perform standard patrols or fence patrols. Rangers on a standard patrol have a similar decision-making rule as poachers. While on patrol, rangers make decisions based on the distance to nearest camp or other ranger teams, rhino signs, terrain roughness, and poaching signs. Just like the poacher decision-making, each variable is scaled from 0 to 1, summed and then divided by the sum of weights. This information is stored as ‘attractiveness’ and describes the likelihood that the ranger moves to that cell. Ranger agents carrying out fence patrols do not make decisions; they always move along the border for a certain number of events. When a fence patrol encounters poaching signs, they carry out the so-called “follow up”. The number of events that the ranger has been on patrol is then reset to 0. This represents that a ‘response team’ takes over to follow the poacher’s track. The ranger agent checks the neighboring grid cells for other poacher signs and moves to the cell with the highest poacher activity. For the following actions, the decision-making is the same as the standard patrol until the agent reaches the patrol duration threshold. If a poacher is on a neighboring cell of the ranger’s location, he catches the poacher. The caught poacher is removed from the virtual park and the ranger ends his patrol. Rangers remember areas where they caught poachers and found poaching signs as risky sites, and tend to patrol those areas more. Rangers also leave signs with the same setup as for the poacher agents. Rangers remember the number of events they have been on patrol. When this exceeds the specified threshold, the ranger moves to the nearest grid cell outside the park or to the nearest camp, depending on which of the two is closest. Just like the poacher, ranger agents wait a certain number of events before going out on their next patrol. The ranger’s waiting rule is the same as the poacher’s waiting rule. Rangers choose a new start location for their patrols based on the memory of any poacher encounters and signs, poached rhino locations, and rhino activity signs. If the ranger does not remember any good sites, he picks a random border cell or a random camp.

5 Scenarios with Different Anti-poaching Strategies

Having the agents in place, several scenarios or strategies can be simulated and compared in terms of how man rhinos have survived at the end of each simulation run. The different anti-poaching strategies were compared with a ‘worst-case scenario’: a virtual park without any ranger teams. For each patrol strategy, the number of ranger teams and the duration of their patrols were varied, in combination with different numbers of poachers. Ranger and poacher numbers were considered a categorical variable with three levels: 1, 2, and 4 poachers or rangers. Patrol duration was also considered as a categorical variable with three levels: 50, 100, and 200 events. The number of camps was set at 1 for all scenarios with rangers. Each simulation run lasts no longer than 10,000 events, but ends earlier if either all rhinos are killed, or all poachers are caught. The outcome variable was the number of surviving rhinos at the end of each run. Each combination of settings was ran 100 times.

The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test for normality. Further analyses were performed with the Kruskal-Wallis test. A post hoc comparison using Dunn’s test with the Bonferroni adjustment was performed if the Kruskal-Wallis showed significant differences between the groups [12]. These conservative non-parametric methods were applied to reduce the possibility of type I error.

5.1 Standard Patrols

The effect of adding more ranger teams carrying out standard patrols was studied in a virtual park with 1 poacher, 2 poachers, and 4 poachers. The amount of time that the poachers and ranger teams are allowed to spend inside the park was fixed at 50 events. The number of surviving rhinos was significantly different between the number of poachers and number of ranger teams (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 567.99; d.f. = 8; P < 0.001). The number of surviving rhinos increased with increasing ranger team numbers (Fig. 1a). There was no significant difference between one ranger or two ranger teams on the surviving rhino numbers when the poacher numbers were kept constant. The same applied for two rangers and four ranger teams for the same number of poachers.
Fig. 1.

Scenario simulation results presented in boxplots. The upper row (a, b) shows the results for rangers using a standard patrol strategy. The lower row (c, d) shows the results of fence patrol teams. The left column (a, c) shows the effect of adding more ranger teams. The right column (b, d) shows the effect of increasing patrol duration. The number of surviving rhinos is on the y-axis for all four plots. For statistical comparisons a Kruskall-Wallis was conducted followed by a Dunn’s post-hoc test. The bars bearing the same letters are not significantly different at the 5% level

The effect of patrol duration was studied in a virtual park with 1 poacher, 2 poachers, and 4 poachers. The duration of a poacher’s hunt was fixed to 50 events. The number of rangers was set to one. The number of surviving rhinos was significantly different between the number of poachers and patrol duration (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 680.58; d.f. = 8; P < 0.001). While the surviving rhino numbers decreases with increasing number of poachers, the results show no significant difference between the different patrol durations (Fig. 1b).

5.2 Fence Patrols

The effect of adding more fence patrol teams was studied in a virtual park with 1 poacher, 2 poachers, and 4 poachers. The amount of time that the poachers and ranger teams are allowed to spend inside the park was fixed at 50 events. The number of surviving rhinos was significantly different between the number of poachers and number of fence patrol teams (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 515.58; d.f. = 8; P < 0.001). The number of surviving rhinos increases with an increase in number of fence patrol teams (Fig. 1c). This effect was similar to the increase in rangers for the standard patrols.

The effect of fence patrol duration was studied in a virtual park with 1 poacher, 2 poachers, and 4 poachers. The duration of a poacher’s hunt was fixed to 50 events. The number of rangers was set to one. The number of surviving rhinos was significantly different between the number of poachers and fence patrol duration (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 527.37; d.f. = 8; P < 0.001). While the number of surviving rhinos decreases with increasing number of poachers, the results show no significant difference between the different fence patrol duration (Fig. 1d).

5.3 Comparison of Anti-poaching Strategies

The two anti-poaching strategies were compared with a ‘worst-case scenario’: a virtual park without any ranger teams. Two parks were created, one with one poacher, and one with four poachers. The duration of a poacher’s hunt was fixed to 50 events. The comparison provides insight in how effective each patrol strategy is compared to a park without any patrols. The number of surviving rhinos was significantly different between the different patrol types and number of rangers in the park with one poacher (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 271.56; d.f. = 6; P < 0.001; Fig. 2a) and in the park with four poachers (Kruskal-Wallis test; H = 451.35; d.f. = 6; P < 0.001; Fig. 2b). As one might expect, the numbers of surviving rhinos was the lowest when four poachers were present. Still, when one poacher was present approximately half of the initial 70 rhinos survived. The average number of rhinos surviving was significantly higher when rangers were present and patrolling. In the virtual park with one poacher the difference between the two types of patrols decreases slightly with increasing rangers. Interestingly, the number of surviving rhinos was not significantly different between one fence patrol team and the two and four standard patrol teams in the one-poacher park. In the park with four poachers the differences between the patrol types are increasing with increasing ranger teams. The number of surviving rhinos was not significantly different between one fence patrol team and two and four standard patrol teams.
Fig. 2.

Results of the patrol strategy comparison presented in boxplots. The left plot shows the result of a virtual park with one poacher and the right plot shows the result of a park with four poachers. The poacher-only scenarios are represented by the boxplot when no rangers where present. The number of surviving rhinos is on the y-axis for all four plots. For statistical comparisons a Kruskall-Wallis was conducted followed by a Dunn’s post-hoc test. The bars bearing the same letters are not significantly different at the 5% level.

6 Discussion and Model Improvements

This study introduces an agent-based model to study the dynamic interactions between animals, poachers, and rangers. The model provides a general framework that can easily be applied to a specific setting or context. In this study the model was applied to an abstract, virtually fenced park to explore the effect of an increase in ranger teams and an increase in patrol duration for standard patrols and fence patrols on the numbers of surviving rhinos.

The results show that the more rangers are being deployed, the less rhinos were poached. From a situational crime prevention perspective [2], providing more ‘boots on the ground’ is a way to increase the risks for poachers. The increase in formal surveillance leads to a higher chance of getting detected and reduces the chances of success. The increase in ranger teams also means that a greater area can be covered or more frequently covered. This improves the knowledge on the spatial and temporal distribution of illegal activities, and hence uncovering the dark figure of crime [6].

The general approach in building this model leads to the assumption that all ranger teams are equal: there are no differences in detection rate and in performance among the ranger agents, regardless of where or when it was deployed in the protected area. However, the effectiveness of one team and their ability to respond to a poaching event is heavily influenced by the amount of training they have received, and the equipment they carry on their patrol [13]. The effect and efficiency of having more patrol teams is only possible when all rangers went through proper training and have adequate supplies of good anti-poaching equipment. The strength of a general model is that it can be easily adjusted. For example, one can introduce variation in the ranger’s ability to detect poacher signs, or different levels of experiences. This can then lead into an analysis of the costs and returns for investing more in ranger teams, equipment, or perhaps in technology, like drones or GPS-transmitters for tracking animals. It also allows to test the proposed rule-of-thumb of 1 ranger per 20 km2 by Bell and Clarke [14]. This was not possible in the current study because the applied context was still a general approach with units that do not map directly to real world measurements.

When resources in protected areas are limited, a different strategy is to go on longer patrols to increase patrol area coverage. However, the results of this study showed that longer patrols were not more effective in protecting rhinos than shorter patrols. Rangers need special training to be able to survive under harsh conditions and in rough environments for an extended period of time. Hence, law enforcement commanders might prefer to send out their teams on shorter patrols, rather than longer ones if indeed they are not more effective. Another study by Nyirenda and Chomba [15] found that shorter patrols of 2 to 8 days were more suitable for the Kafue National Park in Zambia, but stressed that this finding might not be applicable to other protected areas with different environments or in a different social-cultural context. Their statement also applies to the current model. In this study, only three levels of patrol duration were used in a virtual park where poachers only hunt for rhinos. Furthermore, the model also assumed that there are no changes in the ranger’s ability to detect signs throughout their patrol. In other words, the model ignores the possible effect of fatigue on the ranger’s ability. The longer waiting times between long patrols tries to take that into account, but also results in a lower frequency of patrols. This would also explain why no significant differences between patrol durations were found. The model can be further improved by creating a new variable that represents energy or fatigue of the ranger team and how it influences their detection rate.

The results showed that fence patrols were more effective in protecting rhinos than the standard patrols. More specifically, one fence patrol team was equally effective as two or four standard patrol teams. Fence patrols have a higher likelihood of picking up poacher signs, because poachers always start and end at the borders. In addition to that, while patrolling, the ranger agents also leave signs that influence the poacher’s decision-making and likely deflects them. As stated by Eck and Weisburd [16] “offenders avoid targets with evidence of high guardianship”. Hence, offenders seek out new areas or time periods with low guardianship. This is referred to as crime displacement [16]. In the case of wildlife crime, poachers might be spatially displaced to other areas with low security, or temporally displaced by operating at different hours. Especially temporal displacement can be of concern when deploying fence patrols as those are much more linear and predictable compared to standard patrols. While spatial displacement can be observed from the current model, it does not explicitly measure it. Hence, it is still unknown if the observed spatial displacement in the model is a good representation of actual displacement. The model can be easily adjusted to study spatial and temporal displacement. For example, evidence suggests that poachers are more active around a full moon period [17], probably because the light allows them to move through the bush more easily or faster. If more teams are being deployed around these times, poachers eventually are displaced to other moon phases or perhaps even to times during the day. It would be interesting to use the model to study how ranger patrols displace poachers in time and space.

The suggestions mentioned above are just some possibilities to further improve the current model. However, before any of these suggestions are worked into the model, it is important to stress a few limitations. First, no sensitivity analysis was performed to see how each parameter influences the model outcomes. This is especially important when one is interested in studying the conditions under which systems can become critical. ten Broeke et al. [18] suggested the ‘one-factor-at-a-time’ as a good starting point for a sensitivity analysis of an ABM. Furthermore, the current model was not calibrated to a specific protected area, but built around the general context of rhino poaching in South Africa. A true representation of the actual system requires more data on the agent’s behavior. In most cases, data on animal behavior is widely available, however data on ranger and especially poacher behavior is more difficult to collect. Such data usually comes from various sources, each with its own standards. This makes it challenging to create accurate rules for the ranger and poacher agents. However, the model can also be used to test different potential poacher strategies to see which one best reflects the observed behavior. Once these limitations are accounted for, a next step can involve applying the model to a specific context or problem.

7 Conclusion

This study presented a general model to study the dynamic interactions between the three agents that are involved in wildlife crime. The general, abstract approach was done intentionally to keep the model from getting too complex, yet with rules that result in realistic behavior of the animals, poachers, and rangers. The general framework of the model can easily be expanded to include more levels of complexity. When applied to rhino poaching under different anti-poaching strategies, the model provides some general insight in how the different strategies influence the behavior of rhino poachers. The results show that fence patrols are more effective in preventing wildlife crime than standard patrols. Strikingly, even deploying more ranger teams does not increase the effectiveness of standard patrols compared to fence patrols. The model presented here should be regarded as a first step to understand the complexity of wildlife crime and only benefits from further improvements and extensions.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jacob van der Ploeg and Michael Mäs (University of Groningen, the Netherlands) for their help in developing and creating the model. Furthermore, AM Lemieux (Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement) and Craig Spencer (Balule Nature Reserve, South Africa) for their helpful comments and suggestions on the model.

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