Miner's Dillema Iterated

breed [poolAs poolA]
breed [poolBs poolB]

globals [
hidden-strategy
gM ; global miners
]

turtles-own [
 profit
 x ; infiltrating miners
 m ; honest miners
 R ; pool reward (as it seems)

 hR ; reward from honest mining
 xR ; reward from infiltration

 infiltrate-now?
 partner ; the other pool agent
 partner-infiltrated?
 partner-infiltrated-past?
]

to setup

 clear-all

 set-default-shape poolAs "computer"
 set-default-shape poolBs "computer"

   create-poolAs 1 [
    set heading 90
    fd max-pxcor / 2
  ]

  create-poolBs 1 [
    set heading 270
    fd max-pxcor / 2
  ]

  ask poolAs [

    set m m1

    set x int (m / 10) ; set infiltrators as m/10 and integerize
  ]

  ask poolBs [

    set m m2

    set x int (m / 10) ; set infiltrators as m/10 and integerize
  ]

  set gM (oM + m1 + m2)


  ask turtles [

    set size 10

    set partner one-of other turtles

    set infiltrate-now? false

    set partner-infiltrated? false

    set partner-infiltrated-past? false

    run "set-properties"
  ]

   set hidden-strategy one-of [
    "act-randomly"
    "always-honest"
    "always-infiltrate"
    "tit-for-tat"
    "tit-for-two-tats"
    "unforgiving"
    "custom-strategy"
  ]

  reset-ticks
  ;prepare-next-round
end 

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; Play game  ;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

to play
  play-a-round
  tick
  ;prepare-next-round
end 

to play-a-round

  ask turtles [ run "set-properties" ]

  ask poolAs [ run poolA-strategy ] ; run strategies

  ifelse select-poolB-strategy?
    [ ask poolBs [ run poolB-strategy ] ]
    [ ask poolBs [ run hidden-strategy ] ]
  ; determine this round's payoffs based on the action each agent has chosen
  ask turtles [ get-payoff ]
end 

to prepare-next-round
  ask turtles [ set label average-profit ]
end 

to-report average-profit ; Turtle reporter
  report precision (profit / ticks)  3
end 

to-report relative-profit
  report profit / [profit] of partner
end 


;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; Properties ;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

to set-properties

  set R ((m - x) / (gM - x - ([x] of partner)))
  set xR x * [R] of partner /([m] of partner - [x] of partner + x)
  set hR (m - x) * R / (m - x + [x] of partner)
  set profit xR + hR
end 

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; Strategies ;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

to act-randomly ; Turtle Procedure
  set infiltrate-now? one-of [ true false ]
end 

to always-honest ; Turtle Procedure
  set infiltrate-now? false
end 

to always-infiltrate ; Turtle Procedure
  set infiltrate-now? true
end 

to tit-for-tat ; Turtle Procedure
  ifelse partner-infiltrated?
    [ set infiltrate-now? true ]
    [ set infiltrate-now? false ]
end 

to tit-for-two-tats ; Turtle Procedure
  ifelse partner-infiltrated? and partner-infiltrated-past?
    [ set infiltrate-now? true ]
    [ set infiltrate-now? false ]
end 

to unforgiving ; Turtle Procedure
  ifelse partner-infiltrated? or infiltrate-now?
    [ set infiltrate-now? true ]
    [ set infiltrate-now? false ]
end 

to custom-strategy ; Turtle Procedure
  ; Currently defaults to tit-for-tat.  Can you do better?
  ifelse partner-infiltrated? ; partner infiltrateded stores your partner's action last round
    [ set infiltrate-now? true ]
    [ set infiltrate-now? false ]
end 

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; End Strategies ;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

to get-payoff ; Turtle Procedure
 set partner-infiltrated-past? partner-infiltrated?
  set partner-infiltrated? [ infiltrate-now? ] of partner
  ifelse partner-infiltrated?
    [ ifelse infiltrate-now?
      [ if x < m - 1 [set x x + 1] ]
      [ if x > 0 [set x x - 1] ]
    ]
    [ ifelse infiltrate-now?
    [ if x < m - 1 [set x x + 1] ]
    [ if x > 0 [set x x - 1] ]
    ]
end